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CASE NOTES
ernment attorney who is delegated substantial responsibility for a
particular case may be subject to disqualification in a pending case,
if a reasonable number of connecting factors exist between the cases,
and the financial attractions in the pending case are sufficiently
lucrative, to raise the appearance of impropriety. 66
ROBERT LLOYD RASKOPF
Environmental Law—Definition of Major Federal Action Under
the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA) As Applied to Proj-
ects Partially Completed At the Date of NEPA's Enactment
—Minnesota Public Interest Research Group.v. Butz. 1—For twenty
years prior to passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)2 the Department of Agriculture and its subordinate agency,
the United States Forest Service, had entered into numerous sales
contracts with private lumbering concerns whereby the private
companies were permitted to cut an extensive amount of timber3 in
part of a Wilderness Area4 known as the Boundaries Waters Canoe
Area (BWCA). 5 Subsequent to January 1, 1970, the date NEPA
became effective, the Forest Service continued to play an active role
in eleven of the pre-NEPA timber sales, although it did not award
any new contracts for this area. For example, the Forest Service
granted extensions of the land area to be cut under certain timbering
contracts and engaged in some administration of logging operations,
as by mapping out logging roads. The Forest Service did not file a
separate environmental impact statement (EIS) with regard to these
lumbering activities because it intended to include an analysis of
66 The dynamics of litigation are far too subtle, the attorney's role in that process is
far too critical, and the public's interest in the outcome is far too great to leave room
for even the slightest doubt concerning the ethical propriety of a lawyer's representa-
tion in a given case.
Motor Mart v. Saab Motors, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
498 F,2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as MPIRG].
2 42 U.S.C. § 4321-47 (1970). The National Environmental Policy Act was signed into
law on New Years Day, 1970. Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
3
 "In recent years about 45,000 cords of timber on about 3,000 acres of land has been cut
in the Portal Zone [area where timbering is permitted] each year." Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 594 (D. Minn, 1973).
4 A Wilderness Area is defined in the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. 9 1131(c) (1970), as
follows:
A wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works
dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area where the earth and its
community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to mean in this chapter an area
of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without
permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected and managed so
as to perserve its natural conditions . . ,
5 The Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to manage the BWCA. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1133(d)(5) (1970).
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those activities in a more inclusive EIS that was to be issued by
April 1973 in conjunction with a New Management Plan for the
entire BWCA. 6
 On April 24, 1972, however, Minnesota Public
Interest Research Group (MPIRG), a non-profit corporation, after
failing to persuade the Forest Service to suspend timbering voluntar-
ily pending the formulation of an EIS, filed suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota seeking to enjoin the
government defendants and the private companies from logging in
the BWCA until they had fully complied with all the requirements
of NEPA. 7
The district court granted the injunction; 8 it held that the
Forest Service's failure to prepare an EIS covering the timbering
activities on the eleven sales sites after NEPA's passage was "arbi-
trary, capricious and unlawful" in light of the clear legislative man-
date that an EIS be prepared for all "major Federal actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 9 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
with three of its judges dissenting, affirmed the lower court injunc-
tion pending completion of the EIS and HELD: a federal agency's
involvement, in a contract executed prior to NEPA's enactment,
which involves a major impact on the environment, constitutes a
"major Federal action"'° which requires the preparation of an EIS.
Thus the court concluded that the Forest Service's determination of
NEPA's inapplicability to the existing lumbering contracts and its
refusal to file an EIS were unreasonable because the Forest Service's
6 358 F. Supp. at 588.
7 498 F.2d at 1318.
8 358 F. Supp. at 630.
Id. at 624. Section 102(2)(C) of The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1970), provides in pertinent part:
[A]lI agencies of the Federal Government shall ... include in every recommendation
or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the respon-
sible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall consult
with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law
or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of
such statements and the comments and views of the • . agencies, which are
authorized to develop and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available
to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as
provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review processes . . .
1 ° Id.
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activities subsequent to 1970 in regard to the timbering sales consti-
tuted a "major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment.""
This note will begin with a discussion of the Eight Circuit's
utilization of a test of "reasonableness," as opposed to the less
demanding standard of "arbitrariness," to review the Forest Ser-
vice's threshhold determination of NEPA's inapplicability to the
timbering sales. Next, the court's determination that NEPA re-
quirements are applicable to projects begun before 1970 where the
project has a significant environmental impact, will be analyzed in
light of the express statutory mandate that an EIS be prepared for
"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment." 12 Finally, the affirmation of the district court's
injunction despite the existence of the Forest Service's draft EIS
providing for a continuation of timbering in the BWCA will be
discussed. It will be submitted that the Eighth Circuit's resolution of
the above three issues presented in MPIRG accords with the con-
gressional intent in enacting NEPA.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Although it is undisputed that the initial determination of NE-
PA's applicability to any given action lies with the federal agency
undertaking the action,' 3 there is no unanimity among the federal
courts as to the proper standard for judicial review of an agency's
decision that NEPA is inapplicable.' 4 Two views emerge from the
cases which have analyzed the weight to be accorded an agency's
decision not to prepare an EIS in light of the congressional man-
11
 498 F.2d at 1320, 1323, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). See note 9 supra.
11
 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). See note 9 supra.
13
 See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom.
Hanly v. Kleindienst, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
14
 The Second Circuit, in Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973), and the Seventh Circuit, in First Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 484
F,2d 1369, 1373 (7th Cir. 1973), have endorsed the "arbitrary" standard. The Tenth Circuit,
in Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973),
and the Fifth Circuit, in Save Our Ten Acres v. Kreger, 472 F.2d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 1973),
have applied a "reasonableness" standard which allows for more extensive judicial review.
The Fourth Circuit adopted a middle position in Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.
1973), where it upheld an agency's negative determination, stating: "We find no basis for any
suggestions that the decision was arbitrary or reached without adequate consideration of
environmental factors." Id. at 162. Two district court decisions have held that the agency's
negative determination is subject to de novo review by the courts, National Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 366 (E,11N,C. 1971), and Scherr v. Volpe,
336 F. Supp. 886, 888 (W.D. Wis. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972). "The
divergence among the circuits indicates quite clearly that if any uniform standard is adopted,
it will have to be at the Supreme Court level." F. France, Extent of Judicial Review of
Administrative Determination of Applicability of NEPA 7 (unpublished paper prepared for
delivery at a conference of U.S. Attorneys at Orlando, Fla., Jan. 21-23, 1974; copy on file at
the offices of the Boston College Industrial & Commercial Law Review).
15
 See cases cited in note 14 supra. The controversy centers around the proper standard
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date that an EIS be prepared for every major federal action that
significantly affects the human environment." The apparent major-
ity view" is that an agency should be granted wide latitude in
deciding NEPA's applicability to a proposed action, and relegates to
the court the task of ascertaining merely whether the agency has
abused its discretion by arbitrary and capricious decision-making."
The other view, which was adopted in MPIRG, subjects the agen-
cy's negative determination to close scrutiny and analyzes all the
relevant factors to see whether the agency's decision was reason-
able. 19
The statutory language in NEPA provides a strong indication
that a strict standard of review was intended by Congress, at least
as far as the agency's threshhold determination is concerned. Section
101(b) 20
 requires all agencies to "use all practicable means, consis-
tent with other essential considerations of national policy, to im-
prove and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and re-
sources [in order to] fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as
trustee of the environment for succeeding generations; [and] .
attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation .. .." 21
 Thus, environmental concerns are included in
"essential considerations of national policy" and as such command a
very high standard of compliance by the federal agencies. To effec-
tuate this congressional policy, section 101 should not be read as a
vacuous declaration of the national policy on the environment or as
a policy to be implemented in any manner that the federal agencies
choose. Instead, section 102 22 in clear and mandatory language
prescribes the procedure to be followed by the agencies to attain the
goals expressed in section 101, namely the preparation of an EIS.
Further statutory analysis indicates that the high standards
required of a federal agency should be complemented by a rigorous
judicial scrutiny whenever the government agency has decided not
of review, and not upon the issue of whether the agency's decision is reviewable. The
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970), provides that all agency decisions are
subject to judicial review except where: "(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law." The second exception was narrowly
confined in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), to "those
rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no
law to apply.' " Id. at 410, quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945).
See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Note, 13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 802 (1972).
17
 It is difficult to state with certainty what is the majority viewpoint in regard to this
issue, because often an expression of judicial deference to wide agency discretion "is undercut
by what the decisions actually require." F. Anderson, NEPA in The Courts 96 (1973).
" See, e.g., Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 908 (1973).
19 498 F.2d at 1320.
z° 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
21
 42 U.S.C. §§ 433I(b)(1), (3) (1970).
22
 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). See note 9 supra.
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to prepare an EIS. Section 102(1)23 directs that the policies, regula-
tions, and public laws of the United States be interpreted in accor-
dance with NEPA's policies "to the fullest extent possible. . . ”24
That language seems to be addressed not only to the agency but also
to the reviewing court. Since an agency may not possess full objec-
tivity in analyzing its proposed action, 25 it may be more likely to
conclude unjustifiably that NEPA is inapplicable. Therefore, a pro
forma judicial review could thwart the broad purposes of NEPA.
The advocates of the standard of review based on arbitrariness
contend that an agency's decision not to file an EIS is essentially a
factual and not a legal determination. 26 The reasonable rule propo-
nents argue that deciding NEPA's applicability to a proposed action
involves critical questions of statutory interpretation, and therefore
constitutes a question of law. 27 For example, the Forest Service must
decide whether an action with respect to the timbering contracts
constitutes a major federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment, which is not a question of fact, but of
law. 28
Generally, an agency's decision that NEPA is inapplicable to
any proposed project involves "mixed" questions of law and fact. 29
The Supreme Court's approach to "mixed" agency decisions in other
areas of law3 u has been to choose the standard of review which it
23 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1970).
24 Id.
We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language does not provide an escape
hatch for footdragging agencies; it does not make NEPA's procedural requirements
somehow discretionary. Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper tiger.
Indeed, the requirements of environmental consideration to the fullest extent possi-
ble sets a high standard for the agencies, ... which must be rigorously enforced by
the reviewing courts.
Calvert Cliffs' coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
25 See Arizonia Pub. Serv. Co. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1275 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
26 See Hanly v. Kleindicnst, 471 F.2d 823, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1972), In order to ascertain
the environmental effects of timbering in the BWCA, the Forest Service in MP1RG had to
make numerous factual findings such as how many acres of woodland had been timbered,
whether these areas were formerly enjoyed by hikers, how long tree stumps remain before
decomposing, and which kinds of native trees and vegetation would never again thrive in a
timbered forest.
27 E.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v, Butz, 484 F,2d 1244, 1248 (10th
Cir. 1973).
28 Cf. 498 F.2d at 1320.
29. Hardy v, Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, at 828 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908
(1973). "The action involves both a question of law—the meaning of the word 'significantly' in
the statutory phrase 'significantly affecting the quality of the -human environment'—and a
question of fact—whether the [Manhattan Civic Center] will have a 'significantly' adverse
environmental impact." Id.
30 Although there has been no Supreme Court decision dealing with the standard of
review under NEPA, a 1971 case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971), dealt with the question of the correct standard of review under § 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act of 1966, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(1) (1964 ed., Supp. V), and
§ 18(a) of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1964 ed., Supp. V), and
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believes best serves the policy of the statute, and then to classify the
agency decision as "factual" or "legal" in accordance with the chosen
standard of review. 31
Most courts have adopted the Supreme Court's policy-oriented
approach to the extent that even those courts espousing the standard
of review for arbitrariness have strictly scrutinized the agency's
decision in light of the court's own evaluation of whether an EIS is
required, so as to implement the underlying policy of NEPA. 32
 Thus
the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of the district court's injunction in
MP/RG 33 stems not so much from its choice of reasonableness
standard as from its own definition of "major" and "significantly
affects the quality of the human environment." 34
II. DEFINING A MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION UNDER NEPA
The decision of the Eighth Circuit in MPIRG is significant not
only for the application of a standard of review under NEPA based
on the reasonableness of agency action, but also for the finding that
a project begun before the effective date of NEPA but only partially
completed as of that date, is subject to the statutory mandate that
an EIS be prepared for "major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment." Various federal agencies
have attempted to define further the meaning of this statutory
phrase: the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)35 in promul-
gating its Guidelines for the agencies, the agencies themselves in
their definitional Guidelines 36 and the courts in adjudicating the
cases arising under these interpretations. 37 The primary question in
defining this phrase is whether Congress intended to create one
criterion or whether it intended to create two tests whereby: "[F]irst,
this case has been cited by lower courts struggling with the standard of review under NEPA.
See, e.g., Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir.
1973); Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 829 (2d Cir. 1972).
31
 See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 124-35 (1944).
32 See, e.g., Goose Hollow Foothills League v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 877 (D. Ore.
1971), where the court reviewed under the "arbitrary" standard, the decision of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) not to prepare an EIS in regard to a loan of
$3.1 million for the construction of a 16 story high-rise building in Portland, Oregon. Id. at
879. The court remanded the case to HUD and ordered the preparation of an EIS on the basis
of its own decision that the housing project would cause significant environmental effects. Id.
at 879-80. See also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
968 (1973).
33
 498 F.2d at 1325.
34 42 U.S.C.	 4332 (1970). See note 9 supra.
CEQ Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 20550-62 (1973); CEQ Guidelines, May 16, 1972 (not
published in Fed. Reg.); CEQ Guidelines, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724-29 (1971); CEQ Interim
Guidelines, 35 Fed. Reg. 7390-93 (1970).
36
 See, e.g., Forest Service Manual	 1941.22, quoted in Minnesota Pub. Interest
Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 623 (D. Minn. 1973).
31
 For cases interpreting this phrase, see note 14 supra. See also Yarrington, The
National Environmental Policy Act, BNA Env. Rep. Vol. 4, No. 36, at 22-24 (1974) (Mono-
graph No. 17).
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it must be determined whether there is a major federal action; next,
if there is a major action, the impact of that action on the environ-
ment must be determined." 38
The Eighth Circuit has aligned itself with what is probably the
minority39 of jurisdictions which specifically reject the two tier test
and instead merge the two requirements into a single standard
under which the NEPA requirement for filing an EIS is triggered
whenever a federal project has a significant environmental effect. 4 °
Thus, the existence of a major federal action is inferred from
the judical finding of a significant environmental effect. 4 ' This
line of reasoning42 seems to further the legislative policy enunciated
in section 101 of NEPA by promoting efforts by federal agencies
"which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment . . . ."43
In utilizing the two-step test, other courts 44 have devised sev-
eral definitions of "major federal action," as, for example, those
activities which are different from the myriad minor activities with
which the federal government becomes involved and are instead
limited to a federal action that "requires substantial planning, time,
resources or expenditure."45 Even courts which have not articulated
a standard often examine " 'the character of the project' . . . . [T]hey
have considered the physical magnitude, cost and duration of a
project as indicia of its `majorness.' "46
The court in MPIRG aptly criticized these definitions by show-
38 498 F.2d at 1321. See Note, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 939, 942 (1974).
39 It is difficult to state with certainty what is the majority viewpoint in regard to this
issue of statutory interpretation, because very few opinions articulate the criteria used to reach
their determination that the challenged actions were federal, major, and of significant en-
vironmental effect. "Whether a project is a 'major federal action' is, of course, a question
which can only be resolved through a careful case-by-case analysis." Transcontinental Gas
Pipeline Corp. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 464 F.2d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir.
1972). But see F. Anderson, supra note 17, at 84.
" 498 F.2d at 1321-22. "ME the action has a significant effect, it is the intent of NEPA
that it should be the subject of the detailed consideration mandated by NEPA . . ." Id. at
1322.
91 See id. at 1321-22.
42 The majority's approach in MPIRG, however, appears to violate a basic tenet of
statutory interpretation, namely, that "[e]very word and clause must be given effect." Llewel-
lyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 404 (1949). Inclusion of the term "major"
in NEPA raises the obvious inference that not all federal actions are meant to be included.
43 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
44
 Two cases which adopted the two-step test without discussion are Jicarilla Apache
Tribe of Indians v, Morton, 2 ELR 20287, 20295 (D. Ariz. 1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 1275 (9th
Cir. 1973); McLean Garden Residents Ass'n v. National Capital Planning Comm'n, 2 ELR
20659 (D.D.C.), motion for stay of injunction and summary reversal denied, 2 ELR 20662
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
43
 Citizens Organized to Defend the Environment, Inc. v. Volpe, 353 F. Supp. 520, 540
(S.D, Ohio 1972). Accord, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F. Supp.
356, 366-67 (E.D.N.C. 1972). See Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972), where the
court implicitly adopted the defendant's description of "major federal action." Id. at 644.
46
 Note, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 939, 947 (1974),
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ing how the bifurcation in the statutory language creates the possi-
bility that a "minor federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment"A 7 would be held outside the scope of
NEPA. As one commentator has suggested: "It makes little sense to
call a project minor when its environmental effects are significant;
because it is just these effects which section 102(2)(C) requires to be
discussed in the impact statement."48 It is submitted that, if an
action will have a significant environmental effect, an EIS should be
required, regardless of how little money is spent on it or time is
consumed by it.
The task of defining the phrase major federal action becomes
complicated in situations like that dealt with in MPIRG, where the
challenged project.was initiated prior to January 1, 1970, the date
on which NEPA became effective. 49 In addition to the primary
question of how to define a major federal action under the statute
where the project is begun after the statute's enactment, the cases
where the federal project was planned, begun or substantially com-
pleted before that date, raise the corollary issue of whether to
examine only those' actions commencing after January 1, 1970. Most
of the case law in this area of "NEPA and retroactivity" 50 involves
an interpretation of the CEQ Guidelines, which place a premium on
the practicality of applying NEPA to actions already underway:
Application of Section 102(2)(C) procedure to existing pro-
jects and programs. To the maximum extent practicable
the section 102(2)(C) procedure should be applied to further
major Federal actions having a significant effect on the
environment even though they arise from projects or pro-
grams initiated prior to enactment of the Act on January 1,
1970.
Agencies have an obligation to reassess ongoing projects
and programs in order to avoid or minimize adverse
environmental effects . . . . While the status of the work
and degree of completion may be considered in determin-
ing whether to proceed with the project, it is essential that
the environmental impacts of proceeding are reassessed
pursuant to the Act's policies and procedures . 
. 51
Basically, the'courts have employed two different tests in de-
termining NEPA's applicability to activities partially completed as
of the date of NEPA's enactment: (1) where the federal government
47 498 F.Zd at 1321-22.
48 F. Anderson, supra note 17 at 95.
44 In MPIRG, the Forest Service had allowed timbering in the BWCA since the 1940's
and all contracts in the present controversy were awarded before 1970. 358 F. Supp. at 594,
604-09.
sn Yarrington, supra note 37, at 32-33.
31 38 Fed. Reg. 20553 (1973).
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is itself responsible for the project, e.g., dam construction, the
courts have examined the amount of work remaining to be per-
formed on the project52 as an indication of whether the costs in-
curred in undertaking an environmental review 53 outweigh the ben-
efits from such a study; 54 (2) where the federal agency's role in the
project was simply to approve the plans of a nonfederal actor, e.g.,
granting a loan, an easement, or authorizing the action, most courts
have looked to the date of some critical legal event, 55 such as the
date the loan was approved, the easement granted, or the permit
issued. If this critical legal event occurred before NEPA's passage,
the federal action is deemed to be complete 56
 and the project, under
non-federal operation, may continue without the preparation of an
EIS.
In Lee v. Resor57
 the federal district court seemed to adopt a
third approach by distinguishing between continuing projects begun
before January 1, 1970 and ongoing projects begun before that date:
An ongoing project is a project which has a definite
termination date which is known when the project com-
mences, e.g., construction of a highway. A continuing
project, on the other hand, is a project which has no
definite termination date but which is intended to continue
indefinitely, e.g., spraying the St. John's River with a
herbicide to control water hyacinths."
Although the preparation of an EIS might be impracticable for
ongoing projects that were substantially completed at the time of
NEPA's enactment, 59 it is not impracticable in connection with
52 See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the U.S. Army,
470 F.2d 289, 301 (8th Cir, 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973) (NEPA held applicable to
the Gilham Dam project); Maddox v. Bradley, 345 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 (N.D. Tex. 1972)
(building a fence around an already constructed reservoir held to be insubstantial remaining
action); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 577-78 (E.D. Va. 1972) (NEPA held
inapplicable to an airport that was entirely built before 1970).
53 The costs of preparing an EIS may involve the cost of abandoning or substantially
changing the project after a lot of time and money has been invested in it. Virginians for
Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573, 578 (E.D. Va. 1972),
54 The benefits of undertaking an EIS, would include: (1) the assessment of environmen-
tal effects of the project by agencies with special expertise in environmental concerns; (2) a
possible alteration in the project so as to lessen its environmental impact; and (3) permitting
public participation in The agency decision. See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U,S. 908 (1973).
" See, e.g., National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 326 F. Supp. 151, 157 (D. Kan,), aff'd,
455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971) (NEPA held applicable where Secretary of Interior exercised
termination clause of a pre-existing contract after 1970); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp.
99, 125 (D. Alas. 1971) (NEPA held applicable to granting of permit to construct mill at Echo
Grove).
56 See F. Anderson, supra note 17, at 143.
51 348 F. Supp. 389 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
54 Id. at 394.
5 ' Environmental Defense Fund, Inc, v, Corps of Eng'rs of the U.S, Army, 325 F, Supp,
728, 746 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
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"continuing projects" which by definition have no completion date.
The court in Lee took note of congressional concern with the urgent
problem of detrimental environmental effects of federal governmen-
tal activities and the need for rectification without delay. 6° If the
Act were applicable only to actions both begun and completed after
January 1, 1970, and not to continuing projects which were intiated
prior to that date, then the congressional intent that the legisla-
tion address itself immediately to existing problems 61 would be
thwarted.
The district court in MPIRG extended the LEE distinctions
between continuing projects and those projects with definite termi-
nation dates, although it did not use the same terminology. 62 The
court of appeals in MPIRG concluded that NEPA was applicable to
the timbering project in the BWCA, on the basis of three categories
of Forest Service involvement---"contract extensions, contract mod-
ifications, and the administrative actions required by the con-
tracts. " 63 The court did not seem to sanction the critical legal event
approach because its finding of a major federal action was not
restricted to the existence of federal contract changes. after January
1, 1970. 64 In MPIRG the termination of six of the eleven contracts
in the early 1970's was merely fortuitous. Had all contracts run into
the year 2000 before termination, the entire forest could have been
razed without finding a major federal action under the critical event
test.
The Eighth Circuit's holding provides a more flexible test than
the critical event test. Its flexibility lies in its definition of a major
federal action as one which causes a significant environmental im-
pact. If there is a significant environmental effect, then it is inferred
60
 348 F. Supp. at 395. "The intent of .Congress to take immediate steps toward
implementing a policy of national awareness of the need to consider environmental repercus-
sions . . . pervades the entire Act. The immediacy of the action necessary to implement the
Congressional mandate implies an intention to give the Act application to continuing pro-
jects." Id.
61
 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b), 4332 (1970).
62
 This matter is unlike cases dealing with construction of buildings and highways in
which it may make little sense to require an impact statement after the project is
well under way. In such situations, there may be an irrevocable commitment of
resources to the policy decisions previously made, and thus, any review of the
environmental impact of such action may be untimely. However "in the instant case,
the Court finds no such irrevocable commitment to past policy decisions. The Forest
Service is continually involved in making policy decisions on a day to day basis
Minnesota Pub, Interest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 622 (D. Minn. 1973).
63
 498 F.2d at 1318 (emphasis added).
64
 Some of the administrative actions undertaken by the Forest Service include: approval
of the location of temporary logging roads; approval of the use of gravel on such roads;
approval of logging equipment; and approval of clean-up methods. 358 F. Supp. at 609. It is
not certain, however, that the court would have found that these supervisory actions of the
Forest Service taken alone and .not combined with the contract alterations, constituted a
"major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." See id.
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that the federal action causing it was major, 65 even though substan-
tial work had been done on the project prior to January 1, 1970, the
effective date of NEPA. Instead of looking to the magnitude of
funds expended in the timbering activities, the Eighth Circuit re-
garded the dearth of funds allocated to the reforestration program as
evidence of a major federal action because such action would not
restore the environment. Therefore the timbering would have a
significant environmental effect. 66 If the federal government had
sufficient funds to use the most efficient methods of reforestration,
such as prescribed burning of spread slash, 67 there would have been
no significant environmental effect and thus the prepartion of an
EIS would have been unnecessary. Although the small amount of
federal funds expended on the projects seems to be at odds with the
commonly understood meaning of major action, the significant im-
pact approach 68 adopted by the majority 69 does implement the
statutory policy. The objective of NEPA is to require that environ-
mental considerations be weighed before federal agency actions are
undertaken. Once it was established that timbering in the BWCA
caused significant environmental effects, the Eighth Circuit held
that NEPA applied to the timber sales. 7 ° The court's opinion reflects
the weakness in the language of NEPA in that the word "major"
can not be given an independent meaning without thwarting the
purposes of the Act. The Eighth Circuit's approach MPIRG
minimizes this defect.
III. EFFECT OF A DRAFT EIS
Once it is determined that the failure of the federal agency to
prepare an EIS is a violation of NEPA, the reviewing court has
three alternatives: (1) to retain jurisdiction of the case pending the
agency's preparation of the EIS, and permit work to continue on the
challenged project; 7 ' (2) to issue an injunction, effective after expira-
tion of a stated period of time, to permit the defendant to prepare an
EIS without stopping work; 72 or (3) to issue an injunction which
65 See text at notes 39-48 supra. Comment, 26 S.C.L. Rev. 119, 130-36 (1974). But see
Note, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 939, 942 (1974).
66 498 F.2d at 1322-23.
67 This method reduces the "duff"—the organic matter on the forest floor which must be
reduced to permit jackpine seeds to root—over the whole area logged, chars the tree stumps to
hasten their rotting, releases nutrients evenly over the logged area, releases jackpine seeds,
and tends to reduce the visual impact of logging roads. 358 F. Supp. at 617.
68 See F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts 89 (1973).
" 498 F.2d at 1322.
70 Id. at 1322-23.
71 Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens Ass'n v. AEC, 3 ELR 20034, 20036 (D.
Minn. 1972).
72 Forty-seventh St. Improvement Ass'n v. Volpe, 3 ELR 20162, 20166 (D. Colo, 1973),
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restrains the defendant agency from taking any further action until
it has completed an EIS. 73
The district court in MPIRG chose the third alternative and
issued an injunction 74 after balancing the equities through recogni-
tion of the following four circumstances: (1) the probability that the
plaintiff would succeed in convincing the Forest Service to prohibit
all lumbering in the BWCA; 75 (2) the irreparable harm to the
plaintiff, by the reduction of the virgin land in the BWCA which
many of plaintiff's members previously had utilized for recreational
enjoyment; 76 (3) absence of irreparable harm to the defendants; 77 (4)
the strong public interest in preserving a Wilderness Area outweigh-
ing the "local public interest in the economic value of the employ-
ment and income generated by the timber industry." 78 The question
presented to the court of appeals was whether or not the district
court's injunction should be vacated in light of the existence of the
Forest Service's draft EIS which provided for the continuation of
timber-cutting in the BWCA. 79 The position taken by the Forest
Service in its draft EIS indicated that the plaintiff would have little
likelihood of convincing the Forest Service to ban timbering in the
BWCA; 8 ° therefore it was contended that the injunction should be
immediately lifted.
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
issuance of an immediately effective injunction." The basis of the
court's holding was that a draft EIS does not constitute compliance
with NEPA. "[A] draft statement is not the basis of an agency
decision. Its function is to elicit comment that will contribute to a
final statement and it is the final statement that is supposed to serve
as the basis for agency assessment of the environmental implications
of the project." 82 Thus, the court implicitly concluded that, even
though the plaintiff is not likely to convince the Forest Service to
prohibit timbering in the BWCA, it is NEPA's purpose to allow
them the opportunity to try. 83
Other cases where the courts have refused to issue or uphold
73
 Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 2 ELR 20648 (D. Hawaii), motion to quash order suspend-
ing injunction granted, 3 ELR 20130 (JD Hawaii 1972).
74
 Minnesota Pub. IntCrest Research Group v. Butz, 358 F. Supp. 584, 630 (D. Minn.
1973).
75
 Id. at 625.
76 Id.
" Id.	 •
28
 Id. at 626.
29 498 F.2d at 1323.
°° The Forest Service's draft EIS provided for continued lumbering in the BWCA. Id. at
1323-24.
81
 Id. at 1323.
82 Id. at 1324.
63
 Prior to making the final EIS, the Forest Service must consult with and obtain the
comment of agencies with expertise in environmental matters. Then it must circulate copies of
its EIS to the President, the CEQ and to the public. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
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injunctions seem to be based upon a finding that the plaintiff's
interests would not be jeopardized by the continuation of the proj-
ect. In Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens Association v.
AEC, 84
 District' Judge Miles Lord, who issued the injunction in
MPIRG , 85 did not enjoin the further development of two nuclear
generating plants, although he ordered the AEC to prepare the
required EIS's and to consider the alternatives to the projects as
they existed when the EIS's were originally due. 86 He refused to
issue an injunction because "[i]ri this case, the [CEQ] guidelines do
not require suspension of these projects to protect the plaintiffs'
interests."87 In both Minnesota Environmental Control and
MPIRG, the plaintiffs had only a slight chance of actually convinc-
ing the agency to cease or alter its challenged activity—in the former
case because the work was substantially completed, and in the latter
case because the Forest Service was apparently determined to per-
mit timbering to continue. The Eighth Circuit in MPIRG, however,
did not seem to accord any weight to the probability that the
plaintiff would ultimately not prevail; it agreed with the district
court that an injunction was warranted but apparently did not agree
that the plaintiff's ultimate chance of success was controlling in
determining the propriety of an injunction."
Although it has been recognized that NEPA does not mandate
an injunction, 89
 it implements a policy which can be most effec-
tively enforced by utilization of injunction remedies. The essence of
the NEPA procedure is to inject environmental criteria into the
decision-making process and is based upon the presumption that
this new factor might alter the agency's decision to proceed with the
project. 9° It would undercut the congressional intention if an agency
were permitted to allow continuation of a project pending the prep-
aration of an EIS, since that would render impartial evaluation
difficult during the NEPA process." Additionally, NEPA does not
84 3 ELR 20034 (D. Minn. 1972).
at
	F. Supp. at 587.
" 3 ELR at 20036.
47 Id.
" 4 Cf. 498 F.2d at 1323.
14
 See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 3 ELR 20130 (D. Hawaii 1972), where the district
court judge held that the injunction which restrained the defendants from undertaking
construction work on a highway, also would not permit them to expend $2.5 million for
design and engineering on the project. Id. at 20131. The court was not persuaded by the
defendant's contention that it should not be restrained because the delay would cause the
government a monetary loss, because "[djelay is a concomitant of implementation of proce-
dures prescribed by NEPA. . . ." Id., quoting Green County v. FPC 3 ELR 1595, 1601 (2d
Cir. 1972).
44
 Cf. Hearings on S. 1075, 237 & 1752 Before the Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969). See also S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 19-21
(1969).
St "Defendant . .
	 is under the mistaken impreSsion that N.E.P.A. comtemplates a
continuing commitment to a project under review. .
	 . [Sjuch is not the case. N.E.P.A.
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provide for monetary damages to groups or individuals who are
injured by detrimental federal actions: prophylactic relief is the sole
remedy available. 92
 Finally, a court's refusal to enjoin action which
is already underway93
 conceivably could encourage recalcitrant
agencies to delay completion of the NEPA review to the point where
reevaluation of the action is no longer practicable."
As a result of the court's decision in MPIRG, a federal agency
acting in the Eighth Circuit must prepare an EIS in conjunction
with any proposed action which might have a significant environ-
mental impact, and its failure to do so should cause the cessation of
any work on the project pending the completion of the statement.
The cost to the agency in terms of delaying actions until their
environmental effects have been studied is readily offset by the
benefit inuring to the public from the rigorous enforcement of
NEPA.
JUDITH SCOLNICK
Corporations—Successor's Tort Liability for Acts or Omissions of
Predecessor--Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. '—Plaintiff appellees, Cyr and
the administrator of the estate of Couture, sought damages for
personal injuries and wrongful death against the defendant, B.
Offen & Co., Inc., on theories of negligence and strict liability. 2
These actions arose out of an accident which occurred at the Rum-
ford Press in Concord, New Hampshire on October 29, 1969. The
head pressman suggested that Cyr and Couture clean the drying
ovens that were attached to the press. Cyr and Couture entered the
ovens, placed flammable cleaning solvents near the gas burners, and
set to work. 3
 The head pressman, not realizing that Cyr and Cou-
ture had entered the ovens, increased the speed of the press. The
operation of the press was inextricably tied to the working of the
ovens. When the press attained a certain speed, the oven driers
automatically activated. This could be avoided by pushing a saferun
button; however, this safety measure was not used. 4 As a result of
contemplates a suspension of commitments." Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 3 ELR 20130, 20131
(D. Hawaii 1972).
92
 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705 (1970). Cf. Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 578 (5th
Cir. 1974).
93
 This was the situation in MPIRG. 498 F.2d at 1318.
94
 This consideration is more relevant where the project is one which has a definite
termination date, rather than a project which continues indefinitely.
501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
2
 B. Offen & Co., Inc. was a codefendant with R. Hoe & Co., the manufacturer of the
press. Hoe frequently chose Offen ovens to make up the total package of equipment to be
supplied to the purchaser. Id. at 1149 n.3. Hereinafter the B. Offen & Co., Inc. will be
referred to as "the successor" and the B. Offen Company as "the predecessor."
3 Id. at 1148.
4 Id.
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